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HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT:
NO LONGER AN OPTION BUT
A MANDATE
Susan Adler Channick*
I. THE PROBLEM: THE UNSUSTAINABLE TRAJECTORY OF
HEALTH CARE COSTS
The growth in health care costs in the United States in the past two
decades has been staggering and extraordinarily burdensome not only to the
federal and state governments but also to employers and individuals who
purchase their health insurance in the private market. In 2009, national health
expenditures (“NHE”) in the United States grew by 4% to $2.5 trillion, or
$8,086 per capita, and accounted for 17.6% of gross domestic product
(“GDP”).1 According to the Office of the Actuary at the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), growth in NHE is expected to increase an
average of 5.7% per year over the period of 2011–2021, and to account for
19.6% of overall spending by 20212 and almost 50% of overall spending by
2082.3 These predictions are troubling not only because the United States
already spends more than one-sixth of GDP on health care but perhaps, more
importantly, because growth in health care costs substantially outstrips both
GDP growth4 and real earnings.5 This excess growth of health care costs over
economic growth levies unsustainable burdens on all health care payers includ-
* Professor of Law, California Western School of Law; B.A., Cornell University; J.D.,
California Western School of Law; M.P.H., Harvard University School of Public Health.
1 Julie A. Schoenman & Nancy Chockley, Understanding U.S. Health Care Spending,
NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT. FOUND. (July 2011), http://nihcm.org/images/stories/
NIHCM-CostBrief-Email.pdf.
2 Sean P. Keehan et al., National Health Expenditure Projections: Modest Annual Growth
Until Coverage Expands and Economic Growth Accelerates, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1600, 1600
(2012).
3 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE SPENDING 12–13
(2007), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/87xx/doc8758/
11-13-lt-health.pdf.
4 Id. at 13; see also JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., URBAN INST. HEALTH POLICY CTR., CONTAIN-
ING THE GROWTH OF SPENDING IN THE U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM 1 (2011), available at http://
www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412419-Containing-the-Growth-of-Spending-in-the-US-
Health-System.pdf. A chart on the Trading Economics website demonstrates that GDP
growth in the United States is projected to be at three percent for the first quarter 2012.
United States GDP Growth Rate, TRADING ECON., http://www.tradingeconomics.com/
united-states/gdp-growth (last visited Apr. 23, 2013). In the previous twenty quarters, only
five had growth greater than or equal to three percent. Id.
5 SYLVESTER J. SCHIEBER ET AL., SOC. SEC. ADVISORY BD., THE UNSUSTAINABLE COST OF
HEALTH CARE 3 (2009), available at http://www.ssab.gov/Documents/TheUnsustainable
CostofHealthCare_graphics.pdf.
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ing the federal and state governments, employers, and health care consumers
who are increasingly sharing the burden of rising costs.
According to a recent report by the Urban Institute Health Policy Center,
four major and interrelated reasons are the significant drivers of the persistent
rise in health care costs in excess of economic growth.6 The first is over-insur-
ance due to the favorable tax treatment of employer-sponsored insurance to
which approximately fifty-eight percent of non-elderly Americans have
access.7 The second is “the development and dispersion of medical technol-
ogy.”8 The third reason is the “increasing prevalence of chronic disease,”
which tends to be very expensive to treat and consumes a large share of health
care costs.9 The fourth is the consolidation and market power of health care
providers and insurers.10 As will be discussed, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), enacted in March 2010 but not fully imple-
mented until 2014, addresses some of these issues and attempts to mitigate their
effects, but does so incompletely. According to many health policy experts, the
ACA is limited in its efforts to contain health care spending, and either does not
address certain issues at all or does so insufficiently. The process of finding
successful ways to contain health care costs without jeopardizing access to care
and quality of care is only in its infancy.
The excess of growth in health care costs over GDP is particularly dire for
public insurance programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s
Health Insurance Program because, historically, Congress has not allocated
more than eighteen percent of GDP for federal spending.11 Entitlement pro-
grams such as Medicare and Medicaid mandate that the federal government
spend whatever is required to provide benefits to those entitled to receive those
benefits—the elderly, disabled, and deserving poor, including children. If the
federal budget falls short of legislated demands on the public fisc, Congress has
few choices: it can reduce benefits or beneficiaries, it can find ways to raise
additional revenue,12 or it can borrow to meet the demands. In the recent past,
these options generally have been resolved in favor of borrowing, resulting in
6 HOLAHAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1.
7 Id.; see also TAX POL’Y CTR., THE TAX POLICY BRIEFING BOOK II-5-8 (2008), available
at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/TPC_briefingbook_full.pdf.
8 HOLAHAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1; See generally DANIEL CALLAHAN, TAMING THE
BELOVED BEAST: HOW MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY COSTS ARE DESTROYING OUR HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM 31, 68–69 (2009).
9 HOLAHAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1; ROSS DEVOL ET AL., MILKEN INST., AN UNHEALTHY
AMERICA: THE ECONOMIC BURDEN OF CHRONIC DISEASE i (2007).
10 HOLAHAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1.
11 Joseph P. Newhouse, Assessing Health Reform’s Impact on Four Key Groups of Ameri-
cans, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1714, 1719 (2010).
12 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UPDATED BUDGET PROJECTIONS: FISCAL YEARS 2012 TO 2022, at
3–4 (2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/March
2012Baseline.pdf. The Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) updated budget projections for
fiscal years 2012 to 2022 estimate that federal revenues as a share of GDP will rise in 2012
and 2013 because of the “scheduled expirations of tax provisions––such as those that reduce
income and payroll tax rates and limit the reach of the alternative minimum tax (AMT) . . . .”
Id. at 1. Revenues will continue to rise relative to GDP largely because increases in taxpay-
ers’ real income will push more income into higher tax brackets as well as making more
taxpayers subject to the AMT. Id.
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an ever-growing federal debt of approximately $15 trillion, an amount that
equals the size of the U.S. economy.13
More recently, however, fiscal conservatives led by Tea Party congres-
sional freshmen have managed to hold the federal government hostage to their
demands to balance the federal budget without additional revenue sources,
either by raising the debt ceiling or by increasing taxes.14 In particular, the
House of Representatives’ insistence on balancing the budget by relying on
spending cuts alone threatens federal entitlement programs, particularly health
insurance programs such as Medicare and Medicaid in which rising health care
costs continue to burden federal spending. The dilemma in the public sector is
how to keep health insurance safety net programs vibrant within reasonable
budgetary constraints. If the debt crisis in the European Union provides the
United States with lessons, one may be that too much austerity too fast is bad
medicine.15 Certainly Keynesian economists would advocate spending into a
recession over stringent economizing in order to create jobs and grow the econ-
omy.16 However, in times of slow economic growth coupled with a Republican
mandate to neither increase taxes nor raise the debt ceiling, the choices in the
public sector are few. One possible scenario is that Congress allocates less pub-
lic money to federal and state health care entitlement programs. Lower reim-
bursement to providers in public insurance programs incentivizes physicians to,
at least, prefer commercial insurance over public insurance and jeopardizes the
care of vulnerable populations such as the elderly, the poor, and children.
Rising health care costs have an adverse effect on the private insurance
market as well. A new study by the Kaiser Family Foundation that tracks
employer-sponsored health insurance shows the average annual premium for
family coverage in 2011 reached $15,073, an increase of nine percent over the
previous year.17 The study indicates that the cost of family coverage has almost
doubled in just one decade.18 As private insurers raise premium rates to meet
the projected costs of health care, the burden of rising premiums falls on
employers who often shift the rise in costs to employees. It is projected that
rising private health insurance premiums will have an adverse effect on wage
13 Richard Wolf, U.S. Debt Is Now Equal to Economy, USA TODAY, Jan. 9, 2012, at A1.
14 See Federal Debt Ceiling, N.Y. TIMES TOPICS, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/refer-
ence/timestopics/subjects/n/national_debt_us/index.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2013).
15 See Elaine Ganley & Greg Keller, France President-Elect Hollande Has Full Plate,
FOXNEWS (May 7, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/05/07/hollande-defeats-
sarkozy-5162-pct-to-4838-pct. On May 7, 2012, Socialist Francois Hollande was elected the
new French president, defeating incumbent conservative Nicolas Sarkozy. He officially
becomes the new French president on May 15, 2012. A leftist, Hollande has vowed to buck
Europe’s austerity trend. Id.
16 See, e.g., PAUL KRUGMAN, END THIS DEPRESSION NOW! 25, 117 (2012).
17 KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BEN-
EFITS: 2011 ANNUAL SURVEY 1 (2011), available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2011/8225.pdf;
see also Reed Abelson, Health Insurance Costs Rising Sharply This Year, Study Shows,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2011, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/business/health-
insurance-costs-rise-sharply-this-year-study-shows.html (referencing the Kaiser Family
Foundation study).
18 KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BEN-
EFITS: 2012 ANNUAL SURVEY 14 (2012), available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2012/8345.pdf.
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growth as well as the standard of living that individuals will be able to afford.19
Slower wage growth not only affects individuals’ standard of living but also
contributes to a shrinking federal tax base, which, in turn, negatively impacts
the share of national income that can be devoted to goods and services other
than health care.20
The cost-shifting solution to the rise in health care costs in the private
sector is no more a real solution to the problem than U.S. Congressman Paul
Ryan’s (R-WI) “Roadmap for America’s Future.”21 Congressman Ryan, chair
of the House of Representatives Committee on the Budget, has advocated that
Medicare be redesigned from an insurance program to a premium support pro-
gram in order to shift the risks of the rising costs of health care from the federal
government to Medicare beneficiaries.22 Although it is certainly true that cost
shifting results in a decrease in health care costs for the payers (i.e., govern-
ments in the public insurance arena, and employers, individuals, and private
insurers in the private insurance market), it surely does not result in any real
reduction in health care costs. Cost shifting, as the term so clearly indicates,
only shifts the burden of costs onto beneficiaries who are becoming increas-
ingly unable to afford the rising costs of health care.23
Congressman Ryan’s reintroduced proposal has been advertised as a
“kinder, gentler form of premium support.”24 In addition to shifting the rising
costs of health care from the federal government to Medicare beneficiaries,
19 HOLAHAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 5.
20 Id.; see also JONATHAN GRUBER & IAN PERRY, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD OF MASS.
FOUND., BENEFITS OF SLOWER HEALTH CARE COST GROWTH FOR MASSACHUSETTS EMPLOY-
EES AND EMPLOYERS 1 (2012), available at http://www.wbur.org/files/2012/04/0426_health-
care-cost-report.pdf.
21 See generally PAUL D. RYAN, A ROADMAP FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE (2010), available at
http://roadmap.republicans.budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/roadmap2final2.pdf. See also
PAUL RYAN, HOUSE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, THE PATH TO PROSPERITY: RESTORING
AMERICA’S PROMISE (2011) [hereinafter RYAN, THE PATH TO PROSPERITY], available at
http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/pathtoprosperityfy2012.pdf.
22 Proposed Budget Ends Medicare and Medicaid Programs As We Know Them, 3 MEDI-
CARE WATCH (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.medicarerights.org/issues-actions/medicare-
watch-archive/2012-11.php. Although Congressman Ryan’s “Roadmap for America’s
Future” failed to win enough votes in the Senate, Ryan has recently reintroduced the propo-
sal that converts Medicare from a true health insurance program to a premium support pro-
gram, giving Medicare beneficiaries “a set payment to purchase coverage from a private
insurance company or from Original Medicare,” (i.e., the traditional fee-for-service Medi-
care insurance system for people sixty-five and older). Id. Ryan’s proposal also converts
Medicaid from an entitlement health insurance program under which the federal and state
governments jointly fund the program to one in which the federal government’s contribution
is in the form of a block grant (i.e., is capped at a certain amount regardless of the number of
state residents who are eligible for enrollment in their state Medicaid program). Block grants
will have the effect of shifting any additional cost of care from the federal government to the
states and/or Medicaid beneficiaries. Id. As discussed in the text, cost shifting, while benefit-
ing the federal budget, will have no effect on the total cost of health care.
23 See JULIETTE CUBANSKI ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., RESTRUCTURING MEDICARE’S
BENEFIT DESIGN: IMPLICATIONS FOR BENEFICIARIES AND SPENDING 2 (2011), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/8256.pdf.
24 PAUL N. VAN DE WATER, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, WHAT YOU NEED TO
KNOW ABOUT PREMIUM SUPPORT 1 (2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/3-19-12
health.pdf.
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many believe that Ryan’s budget resolution will weaken original Medicare—
the traditional fee-for-service health insurance program for people sixty-five
and older that has been the hallmark of the Medicare program since 1965.25
The proposal contemplates a health insurance marketplace where Medicare
beneficiaries can use the premium support voucher to either purchase a policy
in the private market or purchase coverage from original Medicare. Private
market insurers will be given wide flexibility in their benefit design and can
therefore attract healthier Medicare beneficiaries who might prefer health insur-
ance that is less comprehensive and concomitantly less expensive.26 Such a
design inevitably creates an adverse selection cycle in which less-healthy Medi-
care beneficiaries with serious health conditions disproportionately enroll in
original Medicare causing it to incur higher costs because of the higher need
and demand for health care resources. The end result may be the classic adverse
selection death spiral: the premium costs will rise for all Medicare beneficiaries
enrolled in original Medicare.27 In addition to having to pay higher premiums
in original Medicare, Congressman Ryan’s budget resolution does nothing to
contain the spiraling real costs of health care.
The myriad of attempts to shift the costs of health care from governments
to individuals must not distract those who make public policy from continuing
research, data collection, and public conversations about cost containment in
the health care arena. Without real cost containment, we can anticipate a num-
ber of untenable scenarios may occur. According to the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), by 2018, national health expenditures “will be
over $4.3 trillion, or $13,100 per resident, and account for 20.3% of GDP.”28 If
CMS projections are accurate, in a single decade, national health expenditures
will account for one-fifth of all spending in the United States. More impor-
tantly, perhaps, is the fact that during that period, health care spending will
have grown at the average annual rate of 6.2%, a growth rate substantially
greater than the average projected growth in real GDP during the same
period.29
There is some consensus about what drives rising health care costs. The
opinion of many experts is that rising health care costs are more highly attribu-
table to intense per capita spending than usage by a larger segment of the popu-
25 Marilyn Werber Serafini, New Ryan Budget Would Transform Medicare and Medicaid,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 20, 2012), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2012/
march/20/ryan-budget-medicare-medicaid-republicans.aspx.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Trends in Health Care Costs and Spending, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 2009), www.kff.
org/insurance/upload/7692_02.pdf.
29 Andrea Sisko et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2018: Recession Effects Add
Uncertainty to the Outlook, 28 HEALTH AFF. w346, w346 (2009). The Congressional Budget
Office forecast for average real GDP growth from 2011 to 2017 is 2.4%, substantially less
than the projected average growth rate in health care costs during the same period. CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2012 TO 2022, at 43
(2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/01-31-2012_
Outlook.pdf.
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lation accessing health care.30 If the per capita evidence is correct, then
universal access is not nearly as contributory to higher health care costs as is
overutilization. Higher per capita spending, in turn, is attributed to a number of
factors: expensive technology such as constantly improving imaging tech-
niques; the rising incidence of chronic disease; aging and increased longevity
of the population leading to increased prevalence of people with multiple
chronic diseases; obesity in both the adult and children population; use of
expensive pharmaceuticals to treat various chronic diseases; increased success
in genomic research and attendant treatments for rare diseases; perverse reim-
bursement systems, particularly in the public insurance system, that incentivize
quantity over quality; and a fragmented health care delivery system that often
fails to successfully manage the care of the relatively small percentage of the
population that consumes the lion’s share of health care resources.31
Although these projections of growth in health care spending are ominous
for the private sector with respect to the cost of health insurance premiums and
the concomitant burdens on payers and insureds, the problems of the public
sector have taken a political front seat. As has been noted by many health pol-
icy experts, the cost of entitlement programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid,
creates a disproportionately high financial burden on governments.32 The
states, constitutionally required to balance their budgets, struggle to do so under
the ever-increasing burden of the costs of Medicaid and the Children’s Health
Insurance Program.33 The federal government, which can and regularly does
deficit spend, particularly because of the growth in entitlement programs,34
does so at the expense of federal debt.35 Currently, the public and legislative
concerns over a rising federal debt cannot be underestimated particularly in
light of slower economic growth that is anticipated until approximately 2018.36
30 Charles S. Roehrig & David M. Rousseau, The Growth in Cost per Case Explains Far
More of US Health Spending Increases than Rising Disease Prevalence, 30 HEALTH AFF.
1657, 1657 (2011).
31 See HOLAHAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1, 6–8.
32 E.g., Susan A. Channick, Taming the Beast of Health Care Costs: Why Medicare Reform
Alone Is Not Enough, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 63, 71 (2012).
33 See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: WHERE DO OUR FEDERAL
TAX DOLLARS GO? (2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-14-08tax.pdf.
34 JOHN HOLAHAN & STACEY MCMORROW, URBAN INST., MEDICARE, MEDICAID AND THE
DEFICIT DEBATE: TIMELY ANALYSIS OF IMMEDIATE HEALTH POLICY ISSUES 9 (2012), availa-
ble at www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412544-Medicare-Medicaid-and-the-Deficit-Debate.
pdf. The authors of this report argue that, with regard to public insurance programs such as
Medicare and Medicaid, increases in enrollment have a significant effect on spending in
these programs. While per capita spending is not projected to exceed per capita growth, the
combined effect of both per capita spending as well as increased enrollment does drive up
the cost of public insurance in excess of projected per capita growth. Therefore, in order to
contain costs to the rate of GDP growth, proposals to limit overall spending must be
explored. Id. at 1.
35 See JONATHAN HUNTLEY, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL DEBT AND THE RISK OF A
FISCAL CRISIS 1 (2010). The Congressional Budget Office has predicted that, absent change,
U.S. public debt level will grow from its current sixty-two percent of GDP to ninety percent
of GDP by 2020. Id. at 2–3.
36 But see generally KRUGMAN, supra note 16. Krugman argues that if Keynesian econom-
ics got us out of the depression of the 1930s, it can get us out of today’s depression. Id. at xi.
Since Keynesian economics dictates stimulus, not austerity measures, Krugman would have
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Making changes that will significantly affect health care costs creates an
enormous challenge, particularly with respect to maintaining high quality out-
comes. Such methods must be palatable to politicians who serve constituencies
that display a voracious demand for cutting edge technology and expensive
pharmaceuticals without much awareness of costs. Insured Americans have
grown accustomed to an overabundance of supply and heavily subsidized
employer-sponsored insurance policies. Cost containment strategies must be
acceptable to providers who too are relatively indifferent to costs and have, at
the same time, become significantly more successful and powerful in their
efforts to negotiate reimbursement with insurers.37 With respect to for-profit
players in the health care market, creating disincentives for unlimited profit
margins is difficult and antithetical in a for-profit system. Finally, finding ways
to enlist the various disparate constituencies in the quest of meaningful and fair
health care cost containment policies will require significantly more empirical
data and political will than currently exists.
In addition to the foregoing challenges, the inability of policymakers in
Washington to tell the American people that we cannot afford every interven-
tion that modern medicine can provide makes it impossible to have reasonable
and reasoned public discourse about allocation of expensive health care
resources. Both Democrats and Republicans fear a backlash from their constitu-
encies unless they continue to make promises not to cut spending on health
care, even interventions that have been demonstrated to be non-efficacious.
When it comes to reforming health care, the difficulties raised by a discussion
of health care rationing pervade political discourse. As physician and health
policy expert Gregg Bloche said in a recent New England Journal of Medicine
article,
The R word’s power to stop conversation reflects the popular belief that cost
should be no object at the bedside. This belief has circumscribed elected officials’
efforts to control medical spending. Both Democrats and Republicans have stuck to
variants on a standard story: cutting services that yield no value will do enough.38
There are presently a number of initiatives at both the federal and state
levels to control the costs of health care and health insurance. Some, like the
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute created by the ACA, and the
American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation’s new “Choosing Wisely”
campaign, will move the goal of comparative effectiveness forward.39 But, as
the government do the kinds of things that promote jobs such as hiring back the public sector
employees who have been laid off in the past years. Id. at xi, 202, 227–28. This, Krugman
says, would put the country on a normal unemployment track which would get us back to
something that would feel a lot more like prosperity than the current austerity measures
have. See id. at 202.
37 See infra notes 93–99, 152–59 and accompanying text.
38 M. Gregg Bloche, Beyond the “R Word”? Medicine’s New Frugality, 366 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1951, 1951 (2012).
39 In 2010, medical ethicist Howard Brody published an article in the New England Journal
of Medicine calling on physicians to think about five medical procedures that are overused.
Howard Brody, Medicine’s Ethical Responsibility for Health Care Reform—The Top Five
List, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 283, 284 (2010). The article prompted the National Physicians
Alliance to consult with various medical specialty societies in order to come up with a list of
overused tests and procedures in primary care. See, e.g., When to Say “Whoa!” to Your
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behavioral economist Daniel Ariely notes, there are certain arenas where cost-
effectiveness is generally underutilized; philanthropy and policy are two of the
more notable.40 Although there is significant agreement in predictions about
the effects of rising health care costs in both the public and private sectors and
the need to bend the cost curve, there is relatively little empirical data and even
less agreement about how to accomplish this. Even if it is true that as much as
thirty percent of what is spent on health care is waste,41 forging successful
mechanisms to prevent the wasted health care resources is not so easily accom-
plished. Cost effectiveness research (“CER”) is expensive, which creates a sig-
nificant barrier to empirical research.42 It is also unpopular with many
stakeholders such as patients, politicians, and providers who view CER as
improper government interference in health care decision making and a danger-
ous trend toward the practice of “cookbook” medicine.43
Consumer, provider, and even insurer preference for more and more
expensive health care interventions has become a hardened norm, and changing
behavior is never easy. If the future goal of health care is to provide universal,
high quality health care without unnecessary cost, then we need to start think-
ing about health care as a finite rather than infinite resource. Constraining
usage is always difficult, especially when infinite demand has, in the past, regu-
larly been satisfied by additional spending. It is only when an irresistible force
meets an unmovable object that constraint becomes inevitable.44 The irresisti-
ble urge to consume health care resources is currently meeting a number of
unmovable objects: the federal budget (i.e., the share of GDP allocated by Con-
Doctor, CONSUMER REP. HEALTH, June 2012. On April 2, 2012, the American Board of
Internal Medicine (ABIM) Foundation, in an effort to spread the idea to as many medical
specialties as possible, published nine lists, each identifying five overused or unnecessary
tests or procedures in a different medical field as part of the ABIM’s “Choosing Wisely”
campaign. See Press Release, Choosing Wisely, U.S. Physician Groups Identify Commonly
Used Tests or Procedures They Say Are Often Not Necessary (Apr. 4, 2012), available at
http://www.abimfoundation.org/News/ABIM-Foundation-News/2012/Choosing-Wisely.
aspx. A compilation of the forty-five tests is available at http://choosingwisely.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2012/04/Five-Things.pdf. The campaign focuses not only on shaping physician
demand for their patient’s care but also on patient education about their own medical care.
CHOOSING WISELY, http://choosingwisely.org (last visited Apr. 25, 2013).
40 See Dan Ariely, Surprises From Our Recent Economic History, DAN ARIELY (Sept. 20,
2009), http://danariely.com/2009/09/20/surprises-from-our-recent-economic-history/. The
behavioral economist Daniel Ariely argues that healthy scientific skepticism has not pene-
trated certain arenas that are driven, instead, by rational economics. Id. Politicians who
design social policies such as health insurance systems tend to over rely on the established
dogma that people are always rational actors and therefore eschew the effect of empirical
data to the contrary. Under this assumption, providers should heed empirical evidence that
conflicts with their normative decision making if the goal is to provide excellent health care
while mitigating both overconsumption and misuse of resources.
41 Bloche, supra note 38, at 1951.
42 See Michael E. Gluck, Incorporating Costs into Comparative Effectiveness Research,
ACADEMYHEALTH 4, http://www.academyhealth.org/files/publications/ResearchInsights
CER.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2013).
43 Geri Aston, Show Me the Evidence: Comparative Effectiveness Research Could Aid
Treatment Decisions, ENT TODAY (Apr. 2010), http://www.enttoday.org/details/article/6849
53/Show_Me_the_Evidence_Comparative_effectiveness_research_could_aid__treatment_
dec.html.
44 See Newhouse, supra note 11, at 1719–20.
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gress for federal spending);45 significantly slower economic growth both
domestically and worldwide; the politics of the federal debt ceiling;46 the lack
of appetite of employers to continue to pay for employees’ health insurance; the
enticing smorgasbord of expensive medical technology that American consum-
ers demand and with whose demands providers generally comply; and the rise
in chronic disease as a result of modern lifestyle choices and the aging of the
population.47
With regard to the public sector, the question is whether Congress will
allocate more than the usual percentage of GDP to health care. In the current
political climate, it seems relatively certain that if additional spending on public
health insurance programs can only be accomplished through deficit spending,
Congress will not comply. If health insurance entitlement programs continue to
grow at the current rate,48 the only possible solutions will be a larger allocation
of GDP to the federal government, a larger percentage of that allocation to
health care, or cuts in programs such as Medicare, Medicaid, and the Children’s
Health Insurance Program. The current public discourse involves cutting costs
to the federal government through various methods, such as changing the struc-
tural design of Medicare,49 changing the Medicare reimbursement scheme for
Medicare providers,50 moving all Medicaid beneficiaries from fee-for-service
45 Channick, supra note 32, at 64–65, 71.
46 See Federal Debt Ceiling, supra note 14. Federal law requires Congress to authorize the
government to borrow money any time that spending on programs authorized by Congress
exceeds revenue. Id. This authorization, while not popular, has been fairly pro forma until
May 2011 when the Republican House of Representatives refused to raise the debt ceiling
until there was agreement on spending reductions. See id. The Republican House and the
Democratic Senate and Administration could not come to an agreement on whether cuts to
the federal budget should include increased taxes or just spending cuts. Id. By the end of
July, it appeared that the United States would default, an unthinkable occurrence. Id. Finally,
an agreement was announced by which authority to raise the debt by $2.4 trillion was given,
contingent on spending cuts of $2.4 trillion over ten years. Id. In November 2011, the bipar-
tisan Congressional Commission charged with designing an agreement on deficit reduction
failed to reach an agreement. Id. Currently the federal debt limit is at $16.4 trillion. Id. In an
effort to avoid the automatic across-the-board spending cuts triggered by the failure of the
bipartisan commission as well as the automatic termination of tax cuts enacted by the George
W. Bush administration, top business executives are lobbying Congress to reach a bipartisan
deficit-reduction agreement by the end of 2012. Damian Paletta, CEOs Press Congress on
Debt: Executives Step into Deficit Debate Amid Fears of Looming Tax, Spending Measures,
WALL ST. J., May 11, 2012, at A4.
47 See HOLAHAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1.
48 The United States Government Accountability Office’s (“GAO”) most current prediction
of federal entitlement spending is that, with revenue and discretionary spending remaining at
historical averages, spending on Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and interest would
grow to about seventy cents on each dollar spent by 2040. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-12-521SP, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S LONG-TERM FISCAL OUTLOOK:
SPRING 2012 UPDATE 5 (2012), available at www.gao.gov/assets/590/589835.pdf.
49 RYAN, THE PATH TO PROSPERITY, supra note 21, at 25.
50 See TIMOTHY K. LAKE ET AL., NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM, LESSONS FROM
THE FIELD: MAKING ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS REAL 5 (2011), available at http:/
/www.nihcr.org/Accountable-Care-Organizations.html.
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to managed care,51 or changing Medicaid from an entitlement program to a
block grant program.52 As is regularly noted by health policymakers, if cost
containment is accomplished by reducing reimbursement for providers, physi-
cians are likely to flee from the public sector to the private sector where private
insurance reimburses at higher levels.53 With regard to the private sector, the
question is how much tolerance payers will continue to have for higher pre-
mium costs.54
The best hope and real challenge for both sectors is finding ways to cut the
per capita cost of providing care, particularly to the relatively small segment of
the population that consumes a disproportionately large percentage of health
care resources. The remainder of this paper will discuss some of the initiatives
currently in place at both the federal and state levels that, hopefully, will pro-
vide models for future health care cost containment as well as an analysis of the
feasibility of the success of these models in driving down the cost of health
care. There are many possibilities for reducing the costs of health care; this
paper focuses on only a few. With respect to implementation of the ACA, Con-
gress put a high premium on the success of so-called accountable care organi-
zations (“ACOs”) as the primary means of reforming health care delivery and
reimbursement. This Article describes the ACO model and critiques its viabil-
ity as a successful way to control costs in a private health care market. This
Article also looks at two key states, Massachusetts and California, in which
health industry activity has acted as signs of change and predictors of the direc-
tion of cost containment.
II. THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF COST CONTAINMENT STRATEGIES: THE
ACA AND THE STATES
The ACA was enacted primarily to solve the problems of the current
health insurance market. These changes—the minimum coverage requirement,
the implementation of state health insurance exchanges supplemented by fed-
eral subsidies for citizens and legal residents with incomes between 133% and
400% of the federal poverty level, expanded Medicaid, as well as health insur-
ance market reforms such as guaranteed issue and community rating—are
intended to create a universal health care system in which private insurers can-
not refuse prospective insureds because of either health or wealth status.55 The
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court to uphold both the mini-
mum coverage requirement as a valid exercise of the federal government’s tax-
51 Drew Altman, Duals: The National Health Reform Experiment We Should Be Talking
More About, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June 6, 2012), http://www.kff.org/pullingittogether/dual-
eligibles-health-reform.cfm.
52 EDWIN PARK & MATT BROADDUS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, MEDICAID
BLOCK GRANT WOULD SHIFT FINANCIAL RISKS AND COSTS TO STATES: STATES WOULD
BEAR IMPACT OF RECESSIONS, HIGHER MEDICAL COSTS 1 (2011), available at http://www.
cbpp.org/files/2-23-11health.pdf.
53 Channick, supra note 32, at 78.
54 See infra text accompanying notes 122–42.
55 See Summary of New Health Reform Law, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1, 6, 11 (Apr. 15, 2011),
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8061.pdf.
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ing power56 and the concomitant health insurance market reforms means that,
at least for the moment, the Congressional effort to achieve almost universal
access to affordable and adequate health care has been launched.57
The consequences of severing only the minimum coverage requirement
but leaving the market reforms intact would have been rising health insurance
premiums for the insured because insurers would not have been able to refuse
coverage to people who waited to purchase health insurance until they become
ill.58 In order to absorb the additional health care costs of this otherwise unin-
sured population, cross-subsidization by the insured population would have
been necessary and adverse selection would have been highly likely to occur.
Adverse selection because of rising health insurance premiums would have pre-
dictably caused a rise in the uninsured population and potentially driven private
health insurers out of the market. The foregoing is the primary reason that the
federal government argued against the severability of only the minimum cover-
age provision.59
56 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012).
57 While there might be future legal challenges to certain provisions of the ACA, I think the
biggest challenges will be implementing some of the key provisions such as state health
benefit exchanges, expanded Medicaid and the large employer mandate. It appears, at least at
this time, that more states are demonstrating a willingness to expand their Medicaid program
and to participate in the design and implementation of state health benefit exchanges. Since
both expanded Medicaid and the exchanges are intended to provide universal affordable
adequate insurance, it is paramount that these pieces of health care reform work properly. It
will be ironic if the cost of health insurance under the ACA becomes so expensive to be
unaffordable. There is not much in the ACA to prevent private health insurers from drasti-
cally raising their rates. See, e.g., Reed Abelson, Health Insurers Raise Some Rates by
Double Digits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013, at A1 (noting that one new regulation under the
ACA requires insurers must only submit rate increases of ten percent or more to federal
regulators for review and approval via the healthcare.gov website).
The challenges are likely far from over. See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, U.S.: New Challenge
to ACA OK (UPDATE), SCOTUS BLOG (Oct. 31, 2012, 5:29 PM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2012/10/u-s-new-challenge-to-aca-ok/; Jennifer Haberkorn, More Legal Challenges to
ACA on Way, POLITICO (July 3, 2012, 5:49 PM), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid
=488DDB73-EF5D-4B33-95A0-5AADF2C392AB.
58 What remains to be seen is how many individuals choose to stay out of the insurance
market and pay the “shared responsibility” tax instead. While it has been predicted by the
CBO that approximately four million residents will choose the tax instead of insurance
because of the cost differential, the effect of the minimum coverage provision is not yet
clear. See Testimony of Walter Dellinger, The Supreme Court’s Ruling on Health Care:
Ramifications for the Power of Congress to Lay and Collect Taxes, COMMITTEE ON WAYS &
MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (July 10, 2012), http://waysandmeans.house.gov/
uploadedfiles/dellinger_testimony_7-10-12.pdf. If too many people delay the purchase of
health insurance until they need health care, health insurers may be caught in an adverse
selection cycle that will drive them to lobby Congress for relief.
59 There have been a number of health care experts who allege that the Act can be an
effective way to achieve universal coverage even without a minimum coverage requirement.
Other incentives such as the premium subsidies or perhaps the ability of insurers to charge
higher premiums to those who delay purchasing health insurance until illness may act as
effective proxies for the mandatory coverage. The individual mandate provision has also
been criticized for its fairly ineffective and inexpensive enforcement mechanisms; indeed,
critics have noted that because the penalty for not purchasing health insurance is likely to be
less than the cost of insurance, many young healthy individuals may opt to pay the penalty
rather than comply with the mandate. See, e.g., Mike Dorf, Severability’s Contradictions,
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Although the ACA has a number of provisions that are intended to contain
costs of health care, the real effect of such provisions is, as yet, unknown. Since
many of the provisions of the ACA will either not go into effect until 2014 or
are quite controversial, immediate wholesale implementation is both impracti-
cal and inefficient.60 As an alternative, the Act provides for multiple small
demonstration projects to collect data on which cost containment strategies will
reap benefits in the form of lower cost health care without jeopardizing out-
comes and patient safety.61 Although these demonstration projects are ongoing,
the future of health care cost containment is uncertain. Economists have been
puzzling over a three-year slowdown in the growth of health care spending
prompted by the economy.62 National health care spending growth was 3.8% in
2009 and is projected to be at 4% for 2011–2013.63 The question, of course, is
whether the slowdown is merely an artifact of a soft economy or whether it
might signal a real change in health care spending.
A recent report from CMS Office of the Actuary should put to rest specu-
lation that the current soft spending on health care is a permanent change.64
The Office of the Actuary predicts that health care spending will continue to be
soft until 2014 when the insurance provisions of the ACA are fully imple-
mented, expanding health insurance coverage to an additional twenty to thirty
million Americans who will be insured through Medicaid or the government-
subsidized health insurance exchanges.65 The addition of many more insured
will push health care costs higher—7.4% in 2014—because of increased usage
of health care resources, such as routine physician visits and pharmaceuticals.66
The real question is whether the provisions of the ACA that are intended to
reduce costs, and therefore mitigate the volume effect of the ACA, will be
successful.
A. Cost Containment Initiatives in the Affordable Care Act
Although the ACA contains some provisions aimed toward cost reduction,
whether and how these initiatives will work to actually reduce costs is uncer-
DORF ON LAW (Apr. 9, 2012), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/04/severabilitys-contradic-
tions.html.
60 For example, the Independent Payment Advisory Board, created by the Affordable Care
Act, “will have significant authority to curb rising Medicare spending if per beneficiary
growth . . . exceeds target growth rates.” Jennifer Haberkorn, Health Policy Brief: The Inde-
pendent Payment Advisory Board, HEALTH AFF., Apr. 5, 2012, at 1, available at http://health
affairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_67.pdf.
61 See Ateev Mehrotra et al., Consumers’ and Providers’ Responses to Public Cost Reports,
and How to Raise the Likelihood of Achieving Desired Results, 31 HEALTH AFF. 843, 843
(2012).
62 See Keehan et al., supra note 2, at 1600.
63 Id. at 1600, 1609.
64 See Memorandum from Richard S. Foster, Chief Actuary, Office of the Actuary, Dep’t of
Health & Human Services, on Estimated Financial Effects of the “Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act,” As Amended (Apr. 22, 2010), available at http://www.cms.gov/
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Research/ActuarialStudies/downloads/PPACA_2010-
04-22.pdf; see also Keehan et al., supra note 2, at 1600, 1603.
65 Memorandum from Richard S. Foster, supra note 64, at 2; Keehan et al., supra note 2, at
1600.
66 Keehan et al., supra note 2, at 1603.
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tain. As one group of health care experts put it, “[t]he Affordable Care Act
takes the general approach of ‘letting a thousand flowers bloom’67—that is,
testing myriad approaches to reducing costs” to see which initiatives produce
real cost savings while continuing to provide quality health care.68 Some of the
more well-known initiatives provided for in the ACA include incentives to cre-
ate competition across insurers in the health insurance exchanges, reductions in
Medicare payments, a new excise tax on high-cost health care plans, and the
Medicare shared savings program that incentivizes the use of integrated deliv-
ery systems and reimbursement schemes designed to provide more coordinated
and concomitantly less expensive patient treatment.69 For example, the CMS
Actuary estimates that savings through 2016 of $68 billion can be accom-
plished by reducing excessive Medicare payments to private insurers who oper-
ate in Medicare Advantage, and that an additional $85 billion can be saved
during the same time period by reforming provider payments by tying increases
to the rate of growth in productivity in the economy at large.70 This benchmark
for growth is intended to force health care providers to become more efficient
in order to remain profitable and to tie health care inflation to general economic
growth.71
Many of the ACA’s near-future savings are predicated on reduced reim-
bursement to providers to Medicare and Medicaid patients.72 Although physi-
67 The Center of Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Innovation Center has already
launched a number of initiatives (e.g., demonstration projects, in order to collect data about
which health care models work to reduce costs and which do not). CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: LOWERING MEDICARE COSTS BY IMPROV-
ING CARE 6–7 (2012), available at http://www.cms.gov/apps/files/ACA-savings-report-
2012.pdf. For example, the Innovation Center is testing major changes in primary care in the
belief that the role of primary care physicians is key to cost reduction. Id. at 6. More PCPs
will be needed to care for the additional thirty million Americans who will be entitled to
health care under the ACA starting in 2014, a large percentage of which will be insured
through Medicaid. See Keehan et al., supra note 2, at 1600. In addition, PCPs provide so-
called “medical homes” for patients and are in the best position to manage and coordinate
their care to ensure healthy outcomes. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra,
at 7. To that end, CMS is testing such initiatives as primary care bonus; a comprehensive
primary care initiative, which is “a collaboration between public and private payers and
primary care practices [to] support patient-centered primary care in communities . . . .”; an
initiative to test “whether advanced primary care practice at community health centers can
improve care and patients’ health, and reduce costs”; and an “Independence at Home demon-
stration [to] encourage the use of in-home services” that certain chronically ill patients can
receive in their homes. Id. at 6–7.
68 Mehrotra et al., supra note 61, at 843.
69 See Keehan et al., supra note 2, at 1603–04, 1608–09.
70 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 67, at 2.
71 How is this different from the sustainable growth rate, a method adopted by Congress in
1997 and intended to cap reimbursement to providers? The “Sustainable Growth Rate”
formula was established to track provider reimbursement with both health care costs and the
general economy. See Mary Carmichael, Why Medicare’s “Sustainable Growth Rate” Isn’t,
NEWSWEEK: THE DAILY BEAST (Feb. 25, 2010, 10:02 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
newsweek/blogs/the-gaggle/2010/02/25/why-medicare-s-sustainable-growth-rate-isn-t.html.
Congress has never been able to implement the SGR for fear that Medicare providers will
abandon Medicare patients for more highly-reimbursed private insurance patients. Id.
72 AM. HOSP. ASS’N, UNDERPAYMENT BY MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FACT SHEET 2 (2010),
available at http://www.aha.org/content/00-10/10medunderpayment-1.pdf.
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cians can attempt to raise revenues by reducing the percentage of Medicare and
Medicaid patients in their practices, this choice is not realistic for hospitals and
other institutional providers who continue to rely heavily on Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursement.73 Indeed, if private sector reimbursement levels drop
due to pressure from employers and individual payers, the population continues
to age, and the fully-implemented ACA expands the reach of Medicaid to
include an additional fifteen-or-so million additional beneficiaries, even physi-
cians who, in the past, have relied on the private insurance market may be in no
position to refuse public health insurance reimbursement.
For the past year, the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Innovation
(“CMMI”) has been fleshing out the policy created by Congress in the ACA
and has launched a number of voluntary initiatives that implement the vision of
the ACA: “better population health, better patient experience, and reduced
health care costs.”74 The mechanisms by which these goals will be met heavily
incentivize physician-hospital integration in order to be able to take advantage
of both federal grants that are available to providers who demonstrate an inten-
tion to provide more efficient, effective, quality health care through close align-
ment of physicians and hospitals, as well as the proposed Medicare shared
savings incentive programs.75 As reimbursement rates from both public and
private insurers continue to decrease, more small- and medium-sized physician
groups will seek alignment opportunities in order to survive.76 Even prior to the
ACA, the trend for many solo and small group medical practitioners, particu-
larly younger physicians driven by life-style concerns, was toward hospital
employment or practices that integrate physician groups and hospitals.77 The
incentives in the ACA have simply exacerbated this trend.
Much of the hope of cost containment rests on major changes in health
care delivery systems and reimbursement incentives. In a pre-health reform
world, providers are reimbursed for treating patients’ illnesses rather than for
keeping them well. The ACA is designed to shift the provider focus away from
treating sickness and toward keeping people healthy. Health policy experts
Ezekiel Emanuel and Jeffrey Liebman give one example of the perversity of the
current reimbursement scheme:
If a hospital hires a nurse to follow up with patients after they are discharged in order
to reduce readmissions—for example, to help patients with diabetes improve blood
73 Id. at 1.
74 CLEO BURTLEY ET AL., CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., PHYSICIAN-HOSPITAL INTEGRATION
2012: HOW HEALTH CARE REFORM IS RESHAPING CALIFORNIA’S DELIVERY SYSTEM 2
(2012), available at http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/P/
PDF%20PhysicianHospIntegration.pdf.
75 Id. at 11. The new Medicare shared savings programs are intended to create incentives for
providers to manage the care of Medicare patients in an integrated environment where risks
of more costly treatment as well as the risk of outcomes are shared by the integrated provider
organization. The theory is that the current fee-for-service reimbursement model incentivizes
volume and fragments often duplicative care while integrated models will provide less vol-
ume, less duplication, and better outcomes leading to more cost-efficient care. See id. Prov-
iders whose practices produce savings to Medicare are entitled to share in the savings. Id.
76 See id. at 16.
77 ANN S. O’MALLEY ET AL., CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, RISING HOSPITAL
EMPLOYMENT OF PHYSICIANS: BETTER QUALITY, HIGHER COSTS? 1–2 (2011), available at
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/1230/1230.pdf.
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sugar control—it must pay for the nurse, which is typically not reimbursed by insur-
ance companies or Medicare, and it loses revenue by preventing the readmission.78
The post-ACA reimbursement scheme is designed to incentivize preven-
tion and wellness in order to reduce expensive hospital admissions. David B.
Nash, the founding dean of the Jefferson School of Population Health in Phila-
delphia, predicts that the health plans that survive into the new health care
regime will be those that are “deeply invested in prevention and wellness and
they will recognize that they bear the ultimate economic incentive to keep peo-
ple well.”79 Instead of profiting by ordering more tests and procedures, provid-
ers will profit by ordering fewer at lower costs. “In other words,” explains
Nash, “they will be delivering population health just as the original plans for
the HMO model suggested they would. It will be going back to the future,
meaning they will start to make a real investment in prevention and well-
ness.”80 Although, as a matter of theory and philosophy, such a system makes
sense, the perverse incentives that existed in the era of tightly controlled man-
aged care to stint on patient care still exist.81 The design of reimbursement
incentives to promote wellness without stinting on care will be an important
element in the effectiveness of health care delivery reform, as well as changes
to the health care culture to align the interests of patients and providers.
The ACA provides for accountable care organizations (ACOs), integrated
networks of providers who will be paid a fixed amount per patient plus bonuses
for achieving quality targets rather than a fee for each episode of illness.82
Under the Medicare Shared Savings Program, providers who “can slow the
growth in their patients’ health care spending while maintaining or improving
78 Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The End of Health Insurance Companies,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/the-
end-of-health-insurance-companies/.
79 Joseph Burns, Reform Forces Health Insurers to Reinvent Themselves, 21 MANAGED
CARE 24 (Apr. 2012), http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/1204/1204.healthplan
2020.html.
80 Id.
81 ROBERT A. BERENSON & RACHEL A. BURTON, URBAN INST., ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGA-
NIZATIONS IN MEDICARE AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR: A STATUS UPDATE 1 (2011), available
at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412438-Accountable-Care-Organizations-in-Medi-
care-and-the-Private-Sector.pdf. One difference between 1990s health maintenance organi-
zations and ACOs may be who is perceived to be making health care decisions on behalf of
patients. Id. With HMOs, much of the health care decision making was perceived to be the
purview of insurers rather than providers by using such price control strategies as
preauthorization and refusal of insurers to pay for services. Id. In an ACO, providers them-
selves, control the diagnosis and treatment decisions. Id. In the ACO model, the providers
make clinical decisions, but they “exercise this control under new payment incentives that
encourage greater prudence in the use of health services.” Id.
82 See MICHEALLE GADY & MARC STEINBERG, FAMILIES USA, MAKING THE MOST OF
ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS (ACOS): WHAT ADVOCATES NEED TO KNOW 1
(2012), available at http://familiesusa2.org/assets/pdfs/health-reform/ACO-Basics.pdf (“An
ACO is an entity that is made up of health care providers across the continuum of
care . . . that agrees to be held accountable for improving the health of its patients. If
patients’ health care costs end up being less than would otherwise be expected while health
care quality is maintained or improved, the providers get to keep a share of that savings.
Providers, therefore, have a financial incentive to work together to improve the health of
their patients. A successful ACO should put the patient at the center of all its activities and
ensure coordination of care.”).
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the quality of the care they deliver”83 will be financially rewarded; hence the
rush by health systems to adopt and effectuate the ACO model.84 Although the
drafters of the ACA included the ACO model to incentivize Medicare providers
to adopt ACOs to replace the expensive fee-for-service reimbursement model,
private insurers seeking to contain health care costs have adopted the integrated
system model as well.85 Indeed, the creation of integrated health care entities is
not new. Large health care systems, like the Geisinger Health System and the
Mayo Clinic, have provided integrated care across the continuum for decades.86
What is new is the concept of payment reform to make providers accountable
for the quality of care they provide.87 The Geisinger model, though not men-
tioned by name, was what the Obama administration envisioned could be
accomplished by adopting the ACO model.88
Emanuel and Liebman argue in favor of broad adoption of ACOs not only
because ACOs will improve patient care quality, but also because ACOs will
make traditional health insurance companies superfluous within the next dec-
ade.89 Essentially, ACOs will receive a form of capitation payment directly
from the payers—employers, Medicare, Medicaid.90 Because an ACO’s patient
base is so large, the ACO can engage in its own risk-pooling (i.e., pooling the
health care usage risks among the large number of patients in the pool).91 With
no more claims to deal with and their unique role in risk-pooling gone, Eman-
uel and Liebman argue that there will be no more reason for commercial health
insurance, at least in its present form, to exist.92
Although it might be expected that two health policy experts who were
advisors to the Obama administration in health care reform would be bullish on
ACOs, acceptance of the ACO model as at least a beginning of delivery and
payment reform is more difficult to believe coming from high-level insurance
administrators. “[S]peaking at the HIMSS12 Conference in Las Vegas,93 Aetna
83 BERENSON & BURTON, supra note 81, at 1.
84 See Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg.
19,528, 19,533 (proposed Apr. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425).
85 BERENSON & BURTON, supra note 81, at 2.
86 See Lawton R. Burns & Mark V. Pauly, Integrated Delivery Networks: A Detour on the
Road to Integrated Health Care?, 21 HEALTH AFF. 128, 130–31 (2002).
87 See Ceci Connolly, For this Health System, Less Is More; Program that Guarantees
Doing Things Right the First Time, for Flat Fee, Pays Off, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2009, at
A1. Geisinger offers a ninety-day guarantee to patients who have elective cardiac surgery; if
within the ninety days, the patient has to return to the hospital, Geisinger picks up the cost of
additional care. Id. By 2009, three years into the guarantee program, Geisinger had cut its
elective cardiac surgery costs by fifteen percent and had extended the guarantee to other
procedures. Id.
88 Id.
89 Emanuel & Liebman, supra note 78.
90 Id.
91 Id. Since only a small percentage of people account for a large percentage of health care
costs, ACOs should be able to not only predict risk, but also better identify and manage the
care of high-risk patients. See Anna Wilde Mathews, Can Accountable-Care Organizations
Improve Health Care While Reducing Costs?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2012, at R5.
92 Emanuel & Liebman, supra note 78.
93 The Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society (“HIMSS”) “is a cause-
based, not-for-profit organization exclusively focused on providing global leadership for the
optimal use of information technology (IT) and management systems for the betterment of
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CEO, Chairman and President Mark Bertolini, said a reckoning for the tradi-
tional health insurance model was at hand. ‘The system doesn’t work, it’s broke
today’ Bertolini told attendees. ‘The end of insurance companies, the way
we’ve run the business in the past, is here.’ ”94 Pointing to changes made by the
ACA, Bertolini offered measured praise for the ACA, even for the end of medi-
cal underwriting95 and the controversial medical loss provision.96 Bertolini
stated that regardless of the outcome of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision on
the constitutionality of the ACA’s minimum coverage provision or the Novem-
ber 2012 federal elections, reform is not going away.97 For-profit insurers must
change from their current traditional fee-for-service, commodified, defined
benefit system to a model that uses its “new technologies to help accountable
health systems serve their customers and drive out costs.”98 In the future,
Bertolini predicts that insurance companies will position themselves to help
usher in an era of coordinated care: “ ‘We need to move the system from under-
writing risk to managing populations,’ he said. ‘We want to have a different
relationship with the providers, physicians and the hospitals we do business
with.’ ”99
healthcare.” About HIMSS, HIMSS.ORG, http://himss.org/ASP/aboutHimssHome.asp (last
visited Apr. 26, 2013).
94 Aetna CEO: Health Insurers Face Extinction, HEALTH DATA MGMT. (Feb. 21, 2012,
10:11 PM), http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news/HIMSS12-Aetna-CEO-insurers-
face-extinction-44041-1.html [hereinafter Aetna CEO].
95 Medical underwriting, which is prevalent in the individual and small business market, has
allowed insurers to contain their risk by setting insurance premiums based on the health
status of the prospective insureds. In the Spotlight: ACA Insurance Reforms, BLUECROSS
BLUESHIELD OF NORTH CAROLINA 1 (July 13, 2011), https://www.bcbsnc.com/assets/hcr/
pdfs/spotlight_insurance_reforms.pdf. Those with preexisting conditions that are more likely
to lead to illness and expensive consumption of health care resources have been excluded
entirely. The ACA prohibits medical underwriting and requires a modified community rating
system to be used to set the price of health insurance. Id. at 1–2.
96 Aetna CEO, supra note 94. The medical loss ratio provisions in the ACA require “health
insurance companies to spend 80% of the consumers’ premium dollars they collect—85%
for large group insurers—on actual medical care rather than overhead, marketing expenses
and profit.” Rick Ungar, The Bomb Buried in Obamacare Explodes Today—Hallelujah!,
FORBES (Dec. 2, 2011, 3:44 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2011/12/02/the-
bomb-buried-in-obamacare-explodes-today-halleluja/. Insurers who fail to meet these
requirements must rebate to their customers the amount underspent on actual medical care.
Id.
97 Aetna CEO, supra note 94. On June 11, 2012,
Aetna, Humana and UnitedHealth pledged to continue offering certain preventive ser-
vices without a copayment and allow dependents to remain on their parents’ policies up to
age 26 . . . . All three insurers also said they would continue providing clear and simple ways
for enrollees to appeal coverage claim decisions.
Humana and UnitedHealth added that they will continue to stop lifetime dollar coverage
limits on policies and eliminate rescissions . . . .
Aetna, Humana Pledge to Maintain Certain Reform Law Provisions, CAL. HEALTHLINE
(June 12, 2012), http://www.californiahealthline.org/articles/2012/6/12/aetna-humana-
pledge-to-maintain-certain-reform-law-provisions.aspx?topic=healthcarereform (internal
citation omitted).
98 Joe Flower, Even Aetna CEO Admits: We’re Toast, HEALTH CARE BLOG (May 11, 2012),
http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2012/05/11/even-aetna-ceo-admits-were-toast/.
99 Aetna CEO, supra note 94.
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Much hope for greater efficiency in both the public and private health care
sectors rests on building a successful model to achieve cost containment. The
multi-billion dollar question is whether the yet-untested ACO model will be
successful in seriously moderating costs. The mantra of ACOs is that success
equals reducing costs through improving care.100 To improve care while striv-
ing to spend less, ACOs will need to invest heavily in consulting, systems, care
managers, and IT staff, a hefty contribution for the possibility of achieving
savings somewhere down the road.101 The start-up cost of a real ACO is pre-
dicted to be $30 million or more in a midsize market; since physicians do not
have that kind of capital, they will be looking toward organizations that can
provide it (e.g., hospitals and even health insurance companies).102 Providers,
like all humans, follow financial incentives, and the financial incentives central
to the design of ACOs may not suffice.103 Tom Scully, formerly the adminis-
trator of CMS, believes that the greatest flaw in ACOs is that they are driving
more power to the hospitals rather than to the doctors who traditionally have
driven health care decisions and, therefore, spending.104 In order to reap the
financial incentives of ACOs, physicians are selling their practices to hospitals
in droves.105 Because of the lack of direct financial incentive for physicians,
Scully believes that physicians will not be sufficiently incentivized to practice
more efficient care.106
Jeff Goldsmith, president of Health Futures Inc., a health care consulting
firm, is decidedly bearish on ACOs.107 He believes that, although there are a
number of really good ideas in the ACA for containing costs, the ACO is not
one of them.108 Citing data from the field-testing of ACOs by CMS from 2005
to 2010 that demonstrate the de minimis cost savings effects of ACOs,109 Gold-
smith believes that CMS inexplicably ignored its own data and backed the
“wrong horse” in choosing ACOs as the primary method for cost contain-
100 Mathews, supra note 91, at R5. Donald Berwick, most recently the administrator of
CMS, helped oversee the agency’s efforts to structure ACOs created by the ACA. He
believes that the ACO model will succeed because “it is set up to reward the right combina-
tion of goals for our time: transparency, coordination, consumer power and intolerance of
waste.” Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Jeff Goldsmith believes that “[t]he ACO actually looks like a terrible business deal for
providers.” Id.
104 Id.
105 See id.
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., Jeff Goldsmith, Accountable Care Organizations: The Case for Flexible Part-
nerships Between Health Plans and Providers, 30 HEALTH AFF. 32, 32 (2011).
108 See Mathews, supra note 91, at R5.
109 Id.; The bottom line of CMS’s Physician Group Practice Demonstration is that Medicare
ACOs did “not seem to have succeeded in meaningfully reducing spending growth.” BEREN-
SON & BURTON, supra note 81, at 5. But—as noted by Berenson and Burton—this may be
because there were few incentives for physicians to alter the way they deliver care to achieve
such reductions. The demo has “been criticized for not including strong enough financial
incentives to change provider behavior,” such as “offer[ing] providers the option of taking
on financial risk [and] giving them a more compelling business case for changing the way
they deliver care.” Id.
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ment.110 One of his criticisms of the ACO choice is that saving money on
patients who are not very sick is extremely difficult to accomplish.111 The well-
known skewing of health care costs (i.e., that half the population accounts for
only three percent of health resource consumption) dictates that efforts to save
money should focus on the small percentage of the population that consume the
largest percentage of resources.112 Programs that focus on identifying these
populations and better coordinating efforts to prevent serious illnesses and
expensive hospitalizations are statistically likely to be significantly more
successful.113
Goldsmith argues in favor of the patient-centered medical home as a better
potential solution to the current delivery systems and physician reimbursement
issues. Goldsmith believes that patient-centered medical homes that focus on
care management are more likely to succeed in reducing health care costs than
the ACA’s current ACO concept.114 Because of low reimbursement rates by
both public and private insurers, primary care physicians are forced to see more
patients in order to afford their overhead expenses.115 As a consequence of high
volume, PCPs have developed very low-touch practices.116 The use of patient-
centered medical homes—physician-led practices that incorporate care man-
agement, including protocols and guidelines for how specific clinical risks
should be managed, as well as the use of allied health care professionals—
presumably would facilitate collaboration to maintain continuity of care for
patients.117 This care management model would focus on preventing high-risk
patients from requiring expensive health care interventions and hospitalizations
by monitoring their compliance with less expensive outpatient treatment.118
A particular concern about governmental and institutional enthusiasm for
ACOs is growing market consolidation in both the hospital and insurer market.
Hospital consolidation has the effect of dampening competition among provid-
ers and insurers and giving particularly large hospital groups bargaining lever-
age in the reimbursement negotiations.119 In order to satisfy consumer demand
that certain prestigious hospitals be included in their insurance network, insur-
110 Mathews, supra note 91, at R5.
111 Id. (“ACOs are unlikely to save the federal government any money.”).
112 Id.
113 Atul Gawande, The Hot Spotters: Can We Lower Medical Costs by Giving the Neediest
Patients Better Care?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2011/01/24/110124fa_fact_gawande; see also THE COMMONWEALTH FUND COMM’N ON A
HIGH PERFORMANCE HEALTH SYS., THE PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT IMPERATIVE: UTILIZ-
ING A COORDINATED COMMUNITY-BASED APPROACH TO ENHANCE CARE AND LOWER COSTS
FOR CHRONICALLY ILL PATIENTS 6–7 (2012), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.
org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2012/Apr/1596_Blumenthal_performance_
improvement_commission_report.pdf.
114 See Goldsmith, supra note 107, at 37.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Anna S. Sommers et al., Addressing Hospital Pricing Leverage Through Regulation:
State Rate Setting, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM 2 (May 2012), http://www.nihcr.
org/1tl92.
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ers are paying a premium to include such provider groups.120 By 2009, the gap
between hospital prices paid by private insurers on average exceeded hospital
costs by thirty-four percent, up from a sixteen percent gap in 2000.121 Even in
communities with dominant insurers, there is little incentive for health plans to
constrain hospital costs as long as the increases can be passed on to employers
and individuals.122
Provider consolidation is likely to get worse as health networks seek to
take advantage of the ACA’s economic incentives in favor of ACOs. Since the
very definition of an ACO is provider integration, there is every reason to pre-
dict continued provider consolidation. Restating the position of former CMS
administrator Tom Scully, “[t]he biggest flaw with ACOs is that they are driv-
ing more power to hospitals––not to doctors. . . . The goal of ACOs was to
organize doctors to focus more on patients and keep the patients out of hospi-
tals. Instead, doctors are selling practices to hospitals in droves.”123 Because of
antitrust concerns, “the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion had originally proposed a mandatory antitrust review for ACOs that met
certain thresholds for provider concentration,” but in the face of opposition by
many would-be ACOs, CMS did not require mandatory antitrust reviews.124
Because hospitals can foresee a less fortuitous payer mix when the expanded
Medicaid program comes online in 2014, those with negotiating leverage with
insurers are likely to continue to use their market power to get higher reim-
bursement rates from the private market in order to offset the losses that are
anticipated from a higher percentage of Medicaid reimbursement.125
B. Experimenting in the Laboratories of the States
While awaiting full implementation of the Affordable Care Act, some
states have been conducting empirical research into possible cost containment
initiatives that could be effective not only intrastate but interstate as well. In
addition, changes are occurring in the private health care market that are wor-
thy of note. This Article will discuss two phenomena in particular: (1) empiri-
cal research on the effect of rising health insurance premiums on employers,
employees, and the economy of Massachusetts and the need to contain health
care costs in the commercial market, and (2) the recently noted phenomenon of
insurers acquiring physician practices with data coming from California,
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. One way of forcing providers and insurers to hold the line on provider reimburse-
ment is to use a market approach (i.e., “adopting insurance products that motivate enrollees
to consider price” in making choices about insurance). Id. A tiered approach to enrollee
health care cost sharing such as higher premiums or increased cost sharing by enrollees for
more expensive providers is one way to shift preferences from more expensive to less expen-
sive providers. Id.
123 Mathews, supra note 91, at R5.
124 Robert A. Berenson & Rachel A. Burton, Health Policy Brief: Next Steps for ACOs,
HEALTH AFF., Jan. 31, 2012, at 5, available at http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/
brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_61.pdf.
125 Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Providers to Win Steep Payment
Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31 HEALTH AFF. 973,
978 (2012).
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although this phenomenon is occurring in other states as well. California is a
state where provider consolidation and market power is generally high, and
insurers, recognizing that they might be maneuvered out of the health care mar-
ket, are beginning to go on the offensive. As noted above, Aetna’s Mark
Bertolini has stated that, given the changing health care environment and a
future that does not look profitable for insurers who continue to reimburse on a
per service basis, insurers are positioning themselves in leadership positions to
usher in the new era of coordinated care.126
1. The Effect of Rising Health Insurance Premiums on Employers and
Employees: Empirical Data from Massachusetts
Although providing affordable coverage for most of the population was a
key goal of health care reform, cost reduction must be the next step.127 Accord-
ing to Dr. Jonathan Gruber, a key architect of health insurance reform for the
state of Massachusetts and a technical consultant to the administration on the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, “health care reform can be divided
into two rounds: The ‘coverage round,’ which was answered by the new bill,
and the ‘cost-reduction round,’ which will require long-term technological
innovation and creative thinking.”128 This author would posit that even though
the “coverage round” has survived constitutional scrutiny, the “cost-reduction
round” is still essential. Currently, the state of Massachusetts is assessing the
effects of health care reform on the state fisc.129 Clearly, providing health
insurance and health care to all legal residents of the state necessarily raises
costs since more people are accessing health care under the new regime.
One of the assumptions of a universal health insurance market is that
access to health care itself can drive down the costs of care through increased
price competition in the private health insurance market and can lower spend-
ing per capita due to more consistent access to care and better patient care
management. Both the Massachusetts health reform model and the federal
model require that almost all legal residents and citizens purchase health insur-
ance.130 As a result, the market for individual health insurance (i.e., the state
health insurance exchanges) should see an increase in the supply of insurers
competing at least partly on cost for the business of individuals seeking health
insurance. In a normal market, this phenomenon should drive down the cost of
health insurance. A second felicitous effect of universal coverage is risk pools
with larger numbers of healthy individuals who may have foregone the
purchase of health insurance in a voluntary market.
126 Aetna CEO, supra note 94.
127 Jingyun Fan, After Health Bill, A Push To Curb Costs: Profs Study Medical Inflation,
130 TECH 1, 1 (Apr. 2, 2010), http://tech.mit.edu/V130/PDF/N16.pdf.
128 Id. at 1, 15.
129 Massachusetts health care reform legislation was enacted in 2006. See Focus on Health
Reform: Massachusetts Health Care Reform: Six Years Later, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 1 (May
2012), http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8311.pdf. The plan has been successful in
curbing the rise in the uninsured that has occurred in so many other states, but it has not been
successful in driving the cost of care down. Id.
130 Id. at 9.
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However, what might work in the individual insurance market does not
work in the employer-sponsored insurance market where, at least in most
states, members of employer risk pools could not be refused coverage. At the
current six percent projected growth rate of health insurance premiums, Dr.
Jonathan Gruber and his associate, Ian Perry, estimate that by 2019 employer
contributions to the employer-sponsored insurance market will rise from $18.1
billion to more than $33 billion.131 In an effort to demonstrate the effect of cost
control on premium cost, Gruber and Perry studied the benefits of slower health
care insurance premium growth on Massachusetts employees and employers.132
The study does not speak to the methods by which health care costs can be
lowered but only to the effects that lowering costs have on employer profits,
employee wages, and state economic growth (Gross State Product).133
This study relies on the Gruber Microsimulation Model (“GMSIM”) to
estimate the effects of slower growth of health insurance premiums on employ-
ers and employees.134 This model is based on evidence from the past.135 The
crucial assumption is that future “changes in health insurance premiums will
have the same effects on employer and employee actions” as in the past.136 As
noted earlier in this Article, there is a direct correlation between employer-
sponsored health insurance premium costs and wage growth; as employers are
further burdened by higher health insurance premiums, workers’ wages rise
more slowly.137 This slowdown in wage growth concomitantly affects the
economy at large because workers consume less when they are paid less.
Based on past responses of employers to higher health insurance premi-
ums, “the GMSIM model assumes that the ‘first’ place excess health care costs
go is into lower wages” for employees.138 If premiums continue to grow at the
currently projected rate of six percent per year, “Massachusetts workers will
lose around $17,000 per worker in overall take-home pay.”139 This loss does
not include the employees’ share of premium costs.140 Employers too will suf-
fer from higher premium costs that cannot be passed on to employees, which
will likely result in a reduction in jobs or lower corporate profits.141 Each of
these outcomes is likely to have a negative impact on the state’s economy.142
The report’s authors have modeled the savings in employer-sponsored
insurance that can be achieved through a reduction in premium costs.143 Even
131 GRUBER & PERRY, supra note 20, at 1.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 5.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 10, 12.
138 Id. at 5–6. However, past employer responses were to much smaller increases in pre-
mium costs than are modeled in this report. See id. at 6. It is possible that employers might
respond to much higher rises in premium costs by focusing more on jobs and profits than the
authors have modeled in their report. Therefore, the minimum effect of higher premiums
could be seen on jobs and profits and the maximum effect could be seen on wages. Id.
139 Id. at 1.
140 See id.
141 Id. at 12.
142 See id. at 13.
143 Id. at 2.
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the most modest reductions in health insurance premium growth can yield
major benefits to employers, employees, and the state economy in general.144
For example, over the period of 2011–2019, lowering the growth by just one
percentage point is projected to save employers $10 billion, preserve $7.8 bil-
lion in employee take-home pay, and preserve $1 billion for workforce invest-
ments and business profits.145 The most aggressive growth reduction scenario
modeled in the report has health insurance premiums growing at two percent,
four percentage points less than current growth and 1.5 percentage points less
than projected gross state product (GSP).146 Under this scenario, employer
spending is reduced by $34.5 billion, $33.6 billion of employee take-home pay
is preserved, and $4.1 billion of workforce investments and business profits is
preserved.147
Although the GMSIM model predicts the effects of decreasing health
insurance premium costs, it does not speak to any methods by which these
benchmarks can be reached.148 Negotiators from both houses of the Massachu-
setts legislature reached a compromise on health care cost containment legisla-
tion on July 30, 2012.149 Though there is support for aggressive cost-cutting
measures among employers, others are more cautious.150 As always, in facili-
tating cost containment in health care, the multi-billion dollar question is how
such savings will be achieved. Gruber makes no representations about how
costs should be cut, only that there are large savings to be reaped if they can
be.151 Lynn Nicholas, president of the Massachusetts Hospital Association,
warns against aggressive goals that can only be achieved by cutting jobs: “[W]e
do know that as hospitals have taken billions of dollars out of their expenses
over the last couple of years, most of that has come in labor.”152 Jonathan
Gruber argues that it is not certain that saving money will require job cut-
ting.153 “As the focus shifts to prevention, we may need more lower-paid com-
munity health workers, for example, but less expensive testing.”154 Gruber does
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 6.
149 See, e.g., WBUR Newsroom, Mass. Legislators Reach Compromise on Health Cost Bill,
90.9WBUR (July 30, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://www.wbur.org/2012/07/30/health-costs-con-
tainment-legislation. As this author understands it, the main thrust of the Massachusetts law,
Chapter 224 of the Acts of 2012 (An Act Improving the Quality of Health Care and Reducing
Costs Through Increased Transparency, Efficiency and Innovation), is to tie health care cost
growth to the growth in the state’s economy. A new Center for Health Information and
Analysis is tasked with collecting information about costs from all Massachusetts health care
entities including hospitals, physician groups, ACOs and payers and notifying those that
exceed the state benchmark to file and implement performance improvement plans. See 2012
Mass. Acts ch. 224.
150 See Martha Bebinger, Report: Lower Health Care Cost Growth Means Big Savings,
90.9WBUR (Apr. 26, 2012, 7:49 AM), http://www.wbur.org/2012/04/26/lower-health-cost-
growth.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
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acknowledge that his predictive model does not determine the consequences of
lower health care costs.155
2. Continuing Consolidation of Providers and Payers: Observations
from California
Dr. Mark D. Smith, the president of the California Healthcare Founda-
tion,156 predicts that regardless of the outcome of the challenges to the ACA,
health care reform is already happening and will continue to happen.157 In that
assertion, Smith is joined by a number of voices, many of them from the for-
profit health insurance industry.158 As Chas Roades, chief research officer of
health care consulting firm Advisory Board Co. notes, health care costs associ-
ated with aging are inevitable; even the Supreme Court cannot overturn the
aging process.159 The costs associated with treating the multiple chronic dis-
eases that are more prevalent in an older population are a well-recognized fac-
tor in the rising costs of health care.160
An example of how change is already affecting the delivery of health care
is size (i.e., consolidation in both the provider and insurer markets). Smith
argues that, in times of uncertainty, size is a benefit; even prior to the enact-
ment of the ACA, there have been numerous hospital acquisitions of physician
practices for the purpose of increasing market power to improve price leverage
with payers.161 Although provider consolidation may be beneficial to providers
with respect to payers, the negative fallout could adversely affect health cost
sustainability. In a study of the current negotiating environment between Cali-
fornia providers and payers, health policy experts Robert Berenson, Paul Gins-
burg, and Nicole Kemper found that increasing market power for providers
caused a change that gave providers a stronger bargaining position than payers,
resulting in higher insurance premiums.162 The fear is that costs due to
increased provider power could neutralize the potential of health care reform to
drive down the cost of premiums through increased efficiency in delivery.163
155 Id.
156 The California Healthcare Foundation is a non-profit organization that supports ideas
and innovations to improve health care for all California residents. See About CHCF, CAL.
HEALTHCARE FOUND., http://www.chcf.org/about (last visited Apr. 26, 2013).
157 Mark D. Smith, Tea Leaves Are for Drinking: Health Reform After the Supreme Court
Ruling, JAMA F. (May 16, 2012, 3:03 PM), http://newsatjama.jama.com/2012/05/16/jama-
forum-tea-leaves-are-for-drinking-health-reform-after-the-supreme-court-ruling/.
158 See, e.g., Merrill Goozner, Health Plans Undergo Major Changes to Cut Costs, FISCAL
TIMES (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/03/06/Health-Plans-
Undergo-Major-Changes-to-Cut-Costs.aspx?p=1; Jay Hancock, Some Health System
Changes Will Stay, No Matter How SCOTUS Rules, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (June 19, 2012),
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2012/June/19/health-system-changes-supreme-
court.aspx. Reforms in the private sector are already underway report top officials in the
health insurance industry. Goozner, supra; Hancock, supra.
159 Hancock, supra note 158.
160 Id.
161 Smith, supra note 157.
162 Robert A. Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout in California Foreshadows Chal-
lenges to Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699, 699 (2010).
163 Id.
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Historically, provider consolidation in California was a response by prov-
iders to the market power of payers who were able to negotiate very favorable
risk contracts with providers, both physicians and hospitals.164 When these risk
contracts became burdensome to provider groups, they responded by consoli-
dating through mergers and acquisitions and forming tighter alliances with phy-
sician organizations.165 Over the years, “hospitals and physicians have become
increasingly sophisticated in developing organizational forms primarily to
increase their negotiating clout with health plans.”166 In this effort, they have
been aided by consumer/patient demand for broad provider networks, a demand
that incentivizes payers to have the largest provider networks possible.167 This
strategy has a counter effect: it neutralizes the health plans’ negotiating tool of
network exclusion as a lever for reduced provider reimbursement.168 As a
result of provider consolidation, the price of care rises and concomitantly
affects the price of private insurance premiums.169
In their January 2012 op-ed piece for the New York Times, health policy
experts Emanuel and Liebman predicted that by 2020, American health insur-
ance would be extinct, replaced by ACOs.170 In order to combat the rise in
provider reimbursement, insurers are starting to compete with hospitals, partic-
ularly for primary care physician practices.171 Insurers are interested in physi-
cian practices to attract patients, particularly the non-Medicaid population who,
with mandated health insurance under the ACA, will be searching for primary
care physicians.172 Health plans that are able to fill that demand will profit
under the new regime.173 As Emanuel and Liebman note, some health insurers
see the move from the current third payer climate to ACOs as inevitable, as
evidenced by recent incursions by insurers into the ACO business.174 “If [the
insurers] don’t want to go the way of the dinosaurs, insurance companies will
have to find a new business to be in, one that is useful in the new world of
coordinated care.”175
Aetna’s Mark Bertolini agrees. “Regulatory, demographic, and economic
factors are forcing health insurers to reinvent themselves.”176 The ACA’s ban
164 BONAR MENNINGER, CAL. HEALTHCARE FOUND., ACCOUNTABLE CARE ORGANIZATIONS:
AVOIDING PITFALLS OF THE PAST 3–4 (2010), available at http://www.chcf.org/~/media/
MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/A/PDF%20AccountableCareOrganizationsAvoiding
PitfallsPast.pdf.
165 See Berenson et al., supra note 162, at 701. In ways, it is ironic that hospitals and
physicians have allied with each other given the culture of distrust that has characterized
physician-hospital relationships in the past. MENNINGER, supra note 164, at 9.
166 Berenson et al., supra note 162, at 701.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 701–02.
169 Id. at 702.
170 Emanuel & Liebman, supra note 78.
171 See Rebecca Vesely, Insurers Buy Medical Practices as Health Landscape Shifts, BUS.
INS. (Jan. 15, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20120115/NEWS
03/301159994.
172 See id.
173 See id.
174 Emanuel & Liebman, supra note 78.
175 Id.
176 Burns, supra note 79.
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on medical underwriting as well as the new eighty-five percent medical loss
ratio limitation will cut into the for-profit insurers’ revenue.177 Some insurers
believe that the efficiency of health care delivery will be more effective if
insurers own rather than contract with their provider groups and are able to
manage the coordination of patient care.178 Charles Kennedy, CEO of Aetna
Accountable Care Solutions, explains:
Traditionally, insurers contracted with providers for advantageous fee schedules and
a national network. That was a win-lose negotiation focused on rates.
In the new ACO model, there will no longer be a relationship based on negotia-
tions over rates. It will be a relationship based on data, care management, and analyt-
ics . . . . [T]he core premise of health plans, which is contracting with providers at
discounted rates, is dying. When people say health insurance companies will go
away, that’s what they mean.179
  Insurers recognize that tighter management of health care resources at the
front end is essential to manage the rising costs of health care.180 That necessa-
rily means enlisting doctors whose medical treatment orders drive most health
care spending.181 Such strategies are particularly important to control the costs
of expensive and wasteful medical interventions, such as the choice to use
expensive stent surgery to treat cardiac patients rather than lower cost
pharmaceuticals.182 Under the current insurance model in both the public and
private sectors, providers who are paid to do more are incentivized to overtreat,
even when overtreatment is unnecessary and perhaps even dangerous to the
patient.183 Under this new model, providers would be employed by the insurer
who would pay salaries to doctors and incentivize them to achieve quality and
efficiency goals.184 The counter fear, of course, is that the new model will
incentivize providers, employed by payers, to undertreat (i.e., to do less than
what is necessary to provide good, safe care for their patients).185 The blurring
of lines between providers and payers is all too reminiscent of the managed
care models of the 1990s, against which there was enormous pushback by both
patients and providers and eventually culminated in much looser patient care
management and the consolidation of provider groups in order to achieve mar-
ket power with respect to insurers.186
Although it is easy enough to see why insurers might choose to acquire
physician groups, it is more difficult to understand why physician groups are
consolidating with insurers rather than continuing to form alliances with other
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Christopher Weaver, Managed Care Enters the Exam Room As Insurers Buy Doctor
Groups, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 1, 2011), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/
2011/July/01/unitedhealth-insurers-buy-doctors-groups.aspx.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Anna Wilde Mathews, Insurer’s Cost-Cut Plan: Buy Hospitals, WALL ST. J., June 29,
2011, at B1.
185 Weaver, supra note 180.
186 See Curtis Kauffman-Pickelle, Predator or Prey?, IMAGINGBIZ (July 16, 2011), http://
www.imagingbiz.com/articles/view/predator-or-prey; see also Weaver, supra note 180.
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physician groups and hospitals. In November 2011, UnitedHealth Group Inc.’s
Optum business acquired Monarch HealthCare, an independent practice associ-
ation with 2,300 physicians.187 Dr. Bart Asner, CEO of the California practice
association, says that UnitedHealth’s Optum “has ‘the same vision and values
of caring for our patients.’ ”188 The three things the Monarch Board agreed
were necessary to deliver superior care were upgraded technology, clinical pro-
grams, and capital for growth, all of which it perceived Optum could deliver.189
Health policy experts are pointing to these acquisitions as a key strategy change
by insurers “to persuade and enable provider organizations . . . to take on pro-
gressively more responsibility for the cost of care.”190 Other large insurers have
announced deals involving consolidation with doctors as well. For example,
WellPoint acquired CareMore,191 a health plan operator that owns twenty-six
clinics and is based near Los Angeles, in an effort to stem rising health care
costs by managing care on the front end.192
Certainly, these consolidations can be viewed as giving both the payers
and physician providers a competitive edge in the marketplace where millions
will soon be able to purchase health insurance.193 Insurance companies with a
lot of cash, like UnitedHealth Group, are positioned well to take advantage of
this growing trend and provider groups will profit from increasingly higher
provider group valuations.194 However, in states like California where hospitals
have held a negotiating edge over insurers in the recent past, insurer-physician
consolidations pose a threat to large hospital groups. This so-called landgrab of
physicians, and particularly primary care physicians, will inevitably create “a
clash between the insurance industry and hospital industry as both fight to con-
trol primary care,” which is at the center of care management, the holy grail of
accountable care.195 The fear is that these acquisitions blur the lines between
the business of health care and medical decision making.196 In the 1990s, dur-
ing the era of tightly controlled managed care, insurers were so consistently
accused by both physicians and patients of making medical decisions using the
cost-containment tools of managed care, such as prior authorization, that
patients finally rebelled causing a severe backlash against the health mainte-
187 Vesely, supra note 171.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Ken Terry, Why Are Health Plans Buying Physician Groups?, HOSP. & HEALTH NET-
WORKS, Jan. 2012, at 30.
191 Gregg Blesch, WellPoint Completes CareMore Acquisition, MODERNHEALTHCARE.COM
(Aug. 22, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20110822/NEWS/m3
08229938.
192 Weaver, supra note 180.
193 On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court substantially upheld the constitutionality of the
ACA assuring that sixteen million or so Americans without access to affordable, adequate
health insurance will be able to purchase such insurance through regulated private markets
operated by the various states. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2608 (2012).
194 Vesely, supra note 171.
195 Molly Gamble, The Quiet Takeover: Insurers Buying Physicians and Hospitals,
BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (July 11, 2011), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-man-
agement-administration/the-quiet-takeover-insurers-buying-physicians-and-hospitals.html.
196 Kauffman-Pickelle, supra note 186.
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nance organization (“HMO”) model.197 The real possibility that insurers
reclaim the driver’s seat because of rising health care costs and the inability of
providers to solve the problem looms large, particularly for health systems that
have flourished economically in the last decade.
Wendell Potter, a former executive at the health insurer Cigna, provides a
possible explanation for health insurers’ acquisitions of provider groups.198 In
recent years, health insurers have been able to remain profitable in spite of
rising health care costs because of their lawful refusal of coverage to certain
applicants with predicted high cost health care usage.199 That model, however,
was already becoming unprofitable and would become even less effective in a
health insurance marketplace of guaranteed issue and community rating.200
Without continuing to raise premiums, a practice that is becoming intolerable to
employers and employees, insurers have wrung most of the profit out of health
insurance.201 The profit-maximizing options available to insurers include insur-
ing volume (i.e., having more healthy lives to insure, or changing their model
to increase the bottom line profit).202 Acquiring, rather than contracting with,
physician practices in order to apply coordinated care techniques to physician
behavior may be one way to reduce costs and increase profit margins.203
Despite what appears to be the specter of a reappearance of managed care,
some experts believe that the acquisition of providers by a few large health
plans represents only a small portion of the insurance companies’ effort to
transform the delivery of health care.204 “Paul Ginsburg, president of the
Center for Studying Health System Change, predicts that insurer-provider col-
laboration on [coordinated care] is going to be a major trend” and that the large
insurers’ acquisitions of provider groups is just a hedge against the possible
failure of provider-led ACOs to accomplish cost containment.205 Gail Wilen-
sky, a UnitedHealth board member and health official in the George H.W. Bush
administration, believes that insurers’ purchases of provider groups is one strat-
egy that large insurers are trying out in an effort to reinvent themselves and be
relevant in an era of record-high health care costs.206 Steven Shortell, dean of
the University of California Berkeley School of Public Health, argues that the
pervasiveness of the practice will depend on the nature of the provider mar-
ket.207 The practice, he believes, will not “be spreading like wildfire across the
country.”208 Todd Cozzens, CEO of Optum Accountable Care Solutions, a sub-
197 Terry, supra note 190, at 31; see also Mathews, supra note 184, at B1.
198 Wendell Potter, Analysis: The End of Health Insurance As We Know It?, CENTER FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY (Mar. 13, 2012, 11:52 AM), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/03/05/
8312/analysis-end-health-insurance-we-know-it.
199 Id.
200 See id.
201 See id.
202 Id.
203 See Jeffrey J. Lauderdale & Molly A. Drake, Law Does Not Stop Payers from Buying
Providers, MANAGED HEALTHCARE EXECUTIVE, May 2012, at 12.
204 Terry, supra note 190, at 30.
205 Id. at 30–31.
206 See Weaver, supra note 180.
207 Terry, supra note 190, at 31.
208 Id.
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sidiary of UnitedHealth Group, predicts that the new insurer-provider model
will be looking to share profit margins rather than fighting over them.209
III. THE IMPERATIVE OF COST CONTAINMENT REGARDLESS OF THE
SURVIVAL OF THE ACA
This is a time of great uncertainty for the direction of U.S. health care.
Although the ACA mostly survived constitutional scrutiny, four members of
the Supreme Court would have struck down the Act in its entirety and seven
members agreed to seriously constrain the effect of the ACA’s expanded Medi-
caid provision.210 Such an outcome may broadcast a continuing fight over the
future of federal power, certainly a preeminent piece of the current Republican
agenda.211 The common wisdom among Republicans is that current health care
reform, however heavily oriented to the private market, is a step in the direction
of European socialism. All attempts to persuade legislators to enact reform that
would provide single-payer, universal health insurance is anathema to those
persuaded that the private market can best solve access and affordability issues.
Even though the Court upheld the individual mandate provision, there is no
guarantee the provisions of the ACA will be successful in driving down the
costs of health care or that legislators opposed to the ACA will not try to other-
wise dismantle it and begin the health care reform process anew.212
Notwithstanding the future of the ACA, the United States has reached a
tipping point with respect to costs: employer-sponsored insurance is getting
more expensive for employers and employees; actuarial underwriting by insur-
ers bars an increasing number of people from affordable health insurance; the
number of uninsured and underinsured continues to rise; and public payers, as
well as employers and individuals, can no longer reasonably bear the costs of
health care. How to make health care more affordable is clearly a difficult,
unpredictable task, particularly in an environment of extreme political partisan-
ship. Although achieving universal health care seems to be a task made for
public solutions, it is difficult to imagine how this will happen. On the other
hand, Americans have learned to accept and revere Medicare, a federal entitle-
209 Id.
210 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012); see also id. at
2642, 2666–67 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211 On Monday, June 25, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court gave the Obama administration a
nominal victory by striking down three of four provisions in Arizona’s immigration law,
S.B. 1070, in a 5–3 decision (Kagan, J., recusing). Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492,
2497, 2510–11 (2012). The Court also found that mandatory life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole of juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012). While such decisions appear to make the
argument that the Court may be inclined to find the individual mandate constitutional,
another fair reading is that the seemingly less conservative decisions in Arizona and Miller
make a states’ rights decision to strike down the individual mandate more palatable. But see
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2608.
212 Indeed, Mitt Romney stated prior to the Court’s ruling that if the Court found the indi-
vidual mandate constitutional, his job (if he won the presidential election) would be to work
with Congress to completely dismantle the ACA. See, e.g., Tim Reid, Romney Presses
Attacks on “Obamacare” Before Ruling, REUTERS (June 26, 2012, 4:34 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2012/06/26/usa-campaign-idUSL2E8HQBAA20120626.
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ment health insurance program for those sixty-five and older, in spite of its
rocky beginnings.213
Although the ACA survived its constitutional challenge relatively intact, it
still must be implemented. Apparently, what Congress has given, Congress can
at least attempt to take away. Threats by a Republican-dominated House of
Representatives to repeal portions of the Act or refuse to allocate the funds
needed for successful implementation jeopardize its potential for success. The
commitment to cost containment must be as clear as the commitment to univer-
sal access. The incentives to control costs must be significant enough so that
the natural gravitation toward a profit motive do not overcome the necessity of
not only universal but also affordable and decent insurance.
There is much talk in the health policy community about finding and elim-
inating waste in the health care system as the portal to cost containment. As
former CMS Director Donald Berwick has noted, the savings potential from
cutting waste from the health care system is far greater than from more direct
and blunter cuts, such as eliminating unhealthy people from insurance pools or
severely limiting the coverage of those in the pools.214 Berwick and Hackbarth
look at six potential sources of waste and the savings that they estimate could
occur by making changes.215 The authors estimate, for example, that $2.2 tril-
lion in additional savings in the next decade is necessary to keep health care
costs at a sustainable trajectory, defined as one that lies close to overall GDP
growth.216 Though the sustainable cost trajectory is the prize on which health
policy experts, health economists, and legislators must keep their eye, cost con-
tainment must be thoughtful and cognizant of the first principles of health care
reform: access, affordability, and safety. It has taken many decades to create
the enormous problem of sky-rocketing health care costs; the solution will not
be had in a day. The Affordable Care Act has a number of initiatives that might
work, but it is only when we mine the data from various initiatives that we will
be able to most effectively and fairly rein in health care costs.
213 See generally Don Wolfensberger, Health Care Reform and the Medicare Analogy,
WOODROW WILSON INT’L CENTER FOR SCHOLARS: SEMINAR ON UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE
(Sept. 21, 2009), http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Health%20Intro%20Essay.
pdf (discussing the history of Medicare).
214 Donald M. Berwick & Andrew D. Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in US Health Care,
307 JAMA 1513, 1513 (2012).
215 Id. Although not exhaustive, the authors present the following list: failures of care deliv-
ery; failures of care coordination; overtreatment; administrative complexity; pricing failures;
and fraud and abuse. Id. The authors estimate that in 2011, the United States unnecessarily
spent between $558 billion and $1.2 trillion on health care interventions that did not add
value to the health of Americans. Id. at 1513–14.
216 Id. at 1514.
